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You're It! Tag Jurisdiction over
Corporations in Canada
Tanya J. Monestier*
ABSTRACT
In September 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada released
its decision in Chevron v. Yaiguaje, a case that legal
commentators had been keeping an eye on for years. The Chevron
case has spanned several decades as well as several continents,
and the enforcement action in Ontario was the latest in a series
of procedural moves aimed at enforcing a nearly $10 billion
Ecuadorian judgment against the oil giant. In Chevron, the
plaintiffs sought to have the judgment enforced in Ontario
against both Chevron (the judgment debtor) and Chevron
Canada (a seventh-level indirect subsidiary of the judgment
debtor). The Chevron case did not decide the merits of the dispute,
but rather addressed two discrete jurisdictional questions: (1)
Was a real and substantial connection between Chevron and
Ontario required in order to enforce a money judgment against
Chevron? And, (2) What was the appropriate basis of jurisdiction
over Chevron Canada?
With respect to the first issue, the Court held that
jurisdiction was properly assumed over Chevron, the judgment
debtor, because service of process had been properly effected on
Chevron pursuant to the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure. No
additional showing of a real and substantial connection between
Chevron and Ontario was required. With respect to Chevron
Canada, the Court held that jurisdiction was appropriate in
Ontario because Chevron Canada was carrying on business in
Ontario and it was served with process in juris. It is this latter
holding that has the most potential to disrupt the existing case law.
What the Supreme Court of Canada did in Chevron was
essentially endorse tag jurisdiction over a corporation. If a
corporation is carrying on business-a fairly low standard
judging from the Chevron case itself-and the corporation is
served in juris, then a provincial court will have general
jurisdiction over the corporation. General jurisdiction, a largely
American term, refers to the power of a court to adjudicate any
and all disputes involving a defendant, even those with no
connection to the underlying forum. Although the Court justified
its holding on presence-based jurisdiction over Chevron Canada
on the basis of well-established precedent, this Article takes the
position that this precedent is actually not that well-established.
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For instance, in the leading case cited by the Supreme Court of
Canada, Incorporated Broadcasters, the Ontario Court of Appeal
actually appeared not to understand what is required to assert
presence-based jurisdiction over a corporation. Additionally, this
Article argues that there are various (likely unintended)
conceptual problems created by the Supreme Court of Canada's
decision in Chevron: the adoption of too low a standard for
carrying on business, which results in the assertion of universal
jurisdiction over corporate defendants; the partial subsuming of
the real and substantial connection test; and the conceptual
misalignment between presence-based jurisdiction and assumed
jurisdiction. This latest development in Canada ironically comes
at a time when U.S. courts are dramatically reining in general
jurisdiction. This Article suggests that the United States'
experience with this issue-and its reasons for severely limiting
general jurisdiction-should inform Canadian jurisprudence on
the topic.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In September 2015, the Supreme Court of Canada released the
much-anticipated decision in Chevron v. Yaiguaje.' The case was
subject to extensive national and international media coverage. 2 The
Court in Chevron held that plaintiffs could proceed in their effort to
enforce an Ecuadorian judgment for approximately $9.5 billion (U.S.)
against oil giant Chevron Corporation, as well as one of its indirect
subsidiaries, Chevron Canada.3 The Chevron case is infamous in
* Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law. The author
would like to thank Christopher Moran for his extremely helpful research assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
1. Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 69 (Can.) [hereinafter Chevron].
2. See, e.g., lan Austen & Clifford Krauss, Court Says Chevron Can Be Pursued
in Canada Over Ecuadorean Damage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
201 5/09/05/businessinternational/court-says-chevron-can-be-pursued-in-canada-over-
ecuadorean-damage.html? r=O [https://perma.cc/F3TL-9QXG] (archived Feb. 6, 2017);
Nicole Hong & Kim Mackrael, Canada's Top Court Rules in Favor of Ecuador Villagers
in Chevron Case, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/canadas-top-
court-rules-in-favor-of-ecuador-villagers-in-chevron-case-1441384265 [https://perma.cc/
HR4S-MU5U] (archived Feb. 6, 2017); Sean Fine, Ecuadoreans can Sue Chevron in
Canada, Supreme Court Rules, GLOBE AND MAIL (Sept. 4, 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail
.com/news/national/ecuadorians-can-sue-chevron-in-canada-supreme-court-rules/article
26225413/ [https://perma.cc/7MPK-2AJ9] (archived Feb. 6, 2017); Lisa A. Rickard,
Canada's Top Court Sets Dangerous Precedent in Chevron Case, FIN. POST (Sept. 28,
2015), http://business.financialpost.com/fp-comment/canadas-top-court-sets-dangerous-
precedent-in-chevron-case [https://perma.cclACZ5-JUPL] (archived Feb. 6, 2017);
Cristin Schmitz, SCC Sees Legal Pipeline Reaching from Ecuador to Here for Chevron,
LAWYERS WEEKLY (Sept. 25, 2015), http://www.lawyersweekly.calarticles/2517 [https://
perma.cc/QZS7-UVU2] (archived Feb. 6, 2017).
3. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 96. In a subsequent opinion, the Ontario Superior
Court of Justice granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the enforcement action
against Chevron Canada, concluding that "the plaintiffs' claim cannot succeed against
Chevron Canada." Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corp., [2017] O.N.S.C 135, para. 74 (Can. Ont.).
First, the court held that Chevron Canada's shares and assets were not exigible pursuant
to the Execution Act to satisfy the judgment against Chevron. Id. at para. 34. In this
respect, it stated:
The Execution Act, which is a procedural statute, does not create any rights in
property but merely provides for the seizure and sale of property in which a
judgment-debtor already has a right or interest. It does not establish a cause of
action against Chevron Canada. Chevron Canada is not the judgment-debtor
under the Ecuadorian judgment and, therefore, the Execution Act does not apply
to it with respect to that judgment.
20.17/1 S85
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international litigation circles for its unique procedural posture and
the vast sums of money involved. In the aftermath of the Chevron
decision, newspaper reports and academic articles focused on the
implications of the decision for the enforcement of judgments
(particularly against an indirect subsidiary of the defendant) and for
the law of corporate personality.4
The aspect of Chevron that no one has really focused on is what
Chevron said about presence-based jurisdiction over corporations. The
Supreme Court of Canada concluded that Ontario had jurisdiction
simpliciter over Chevron Canada because Chevron Canada was
properly served at a place where it carried on business in Ontario.5 The
Court viewed this as a classic application of presence-based
jurisdiction. It reiterated that presence-based jurisdiction was a
"traditional" basis of jurisdiction, and that resorting to the real and
substantial connection test was not necessary where a plaintiff relies
on presence-based jurisdiction.6
What the Supreme Court of Canada has done in Chevron is to
endorse "tag jurisdiction" for corporations.7 If a corporation can be
Id. at para. 37. Second, the court refused to pierce the corporate veil so as to allow the
plaintiffs to use Chevron Canada's assets to satisfy a potential judgment against
Chevron. The court reasoned:
The plaintiffs do not allege that the corporate structure of which Chevron
Canada is a part was designed or used as an instrument of fraud or wrongdoing.
In fact, they specifically plead that they "do not allege any wrongdoing against
Chevron Canada." As such, they cannot establish wrongdoing akin to fraud in
the corporate structure between Chevron and Chevron Canada. They, therefore,
do not meet this fundamental condition of piercing Chevron Canada's corporate
veil.
Id. at para. 65. It is important to note that the Supreme Court's pronouncements about
jurisdiction over Chevron Canada are still good law notwithstanding that the action
against Chevron Canada was ultimately dismissed on the merits.
4. See Jason MacLean, Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje: Canadian Law and the New
Global Economic and Environmental Realities, 57 CAN. BUS. L. J. 367 (2016); Joel
Reinhardt & Aweis Osman, Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje: Expansion of Canada's Generous
and Liberal Approach in the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 45
ADVOC. Q. 339 (2016); Linda J. Silberman & Aaron D. Simowitz, Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments and Awards: What Hath Daimler Wrought?, 91
N.Y.U. L. REV. 344, 348-49 (2016); Sarah Whitmore & Vitali Berditchevski, Jurisdiction
to Enforce Foreign Judgments in Canada Clarified by Supreme Court of Canada, 31
BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 411 (2016); Jason MacLean, The Cult of Corporate Personality:
Yaiguaje v. Chevron Corporation, 55 CAN. BUS. L. J. 282 (2015).
5. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 94.
6. Id. at paras. 89-90, 94.
7. Tag jurisdiction is a term that is sometimes used to refer to presence-based
jurisdiction over individuals. If an individual is served with process while physically
present in the forum (i.e., he is tagged), then he is subject to personal jurisdiction there.
In the United States, tag jurisdiction does not apply to corporations. See generally
Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2014); Cody James Jacobs, If
Corporations Are People, Why Can't They Play Tag?, 46 N. M. L. REV. 1 (2015).
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"tagged" with process in a province where it is carrying on business,
then the corporation "is it," meaning that the corporation will be
subject to jurisdiction in that province for any and all claims, including
those with no connection to the forum. This is a startling proposition.
Consider the facts of Chevron itself: Chevron Canada's head office was
in Alberta and its registered office was in British Columbia. Its
connection to Ontario was minimal. Thirteen of its seven hundred
Canadian employees worked in Ontario, selling lubricant and chemical
products. Three of these thirteen employees worked out of a physical
office in Ontario.8 Stated differently, 0.004 percent of Chevron
Canada's workforce was present at the physical bricks-and-mortar
location in Ontario, where Chevron Canada was served with process.
And yet, this was sufficient for an Ontario court to assert jurisdiction
over Chevron Canada with respect to a cause of action that had
absolutely nothing to do with its activities in Ontario.
While presence-based jurisdiction over natural persons is well-
established, there is little support in the case law for the proposition
that service of process on a corporation that is carrying on business in
the forum confers general jurisdiction over the corporation. The Court's
endorsement of presence-based (or tag) jurisdiction over corporations
will certainly make it much easier for plaintiffs to ground jurisdiction
over corporate defendants. But it is unclear whether the Court realized
just how dramatic the implications of presence-based jurisdiction over
corporations will be. This Article will discuss those implications and
the (perhaps unintended) consequences of the Chevron holding with
respect to presence-based jurisdiction.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II discusses the Chevron
decision, with particular focus on the Supreme Court of Canada's
pronouncement that presence-based jurisdiction was appropriately
asserted over Chevron Canada because it had been served with process
at its physical offices in Ontario. Part III deconstructs the Chevron
decision and argues that presence-based jurisdiction is not supported
by Canadian case law (or at least not the case law cited by the Court
itself). Part IV focuses on the various conceptual problems created by
Chevron: the adoption of too low a standard for carrying on business
which results in the endorsement of universal jurisdiction over
corporate defendants, the partial subsuming of the real and
substantial connection test, and the Chevron test's conceptual
misalignment with Van Breda. Part V contrasts the developments in
Canada with those in the United States and argues that, just as U.S.
courts are dramatically reining in general jurisdiction (by eliminating
"doing business" jurisdiction), Canadian courts are dramatically
8. Factum of the Appellant Chevron Can. Ltd., Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje,
[2015] 3 S.C.R. 69 (Can.) (No. 35682), para. 12. This presence in Ontario started in May
2012, the same month as the enforcement proceedings were commenced in Ontario, but
decades after all the events occurred and the underlying lawsuits were filed.
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expanding general jurisdiction. Part V also examines the policy
reasons behind the shift in the American case law and argues that they
are equally applicable to Canada. Part VI offers some concluding
remarks.
II. THE CHEVRON DECISION
In Chevron, the plaintiffs sought to recognize and enforce in
Ontario a $9.5 billion (U.S.) judgment against both Chevron and
Chevron Canada.9 The enforcement proceedings in Ontario were part
of a decades-long battle between oil giant Chevron and a class of
Ecuadorian plaintiffs who advanced a variety of claims related to
Chevron's oil extraction activities in Ecuador dating back to the
1960s.10 The case was originally brought in federal court in New York.
After years of litigation, the New York court dismissed the case on the
basis of forum non conveniens." The Ecuadorian plaintiffs refiled their
suit in Ecuador, ultimately winning a judgment of nearly $17.2 billion.
This figure was reduced to $9.51 billion on appeal. 12
The plaintiffs attempted to enforce the Ecuadorian judgment in
U.S. courts to no avail.13 The plaintiffs also sought to have the
judgment recognized and enforced in Ontario. To that end, the
plaintiffs sued both Chevron (the judgment debtor) and Chevron
Canada, a seventh-level indirect subsidiary of Chevron. Chevron was
served at its head office in California. Chevron Canada was served both
at its extra-provincially registered office in British Columbia and at its
place of business in Ontario. Both Chevron and Chevron Canada
sought orders setting aside service ex juris of the amended statement
of claim, arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the action.14
The motion judge ruled in the plaintiffs' favor with respect to
jurisdiction, holding that Ontario did have jurisdiction over the action.
However, he exercised the court's power to stay the proceeding under
section 106 of the Ontario Courts of Justice Act.' 5 The Ontario Court
9. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at paras. 6, 70-75. The description here is necessarily
abbreviated, as the underlying litigation does not have a bearing on the jurisdictional
issue discussed in this Article.
10. The claims were actually against Chevron's predecessor, Texaco, and its
subsidiary.
11. Chevron v. Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d 581, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) [hereinafter
Donziger].
12. See Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 6.
13. See Donziger, 768 F. Supp. 2d at 626-27, 660.
14. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 14.
15. Id. at para. 15. The Supreme Court described the motion judge's reasons for
ordering a stay as follows:
First, Chevron does not own, has never owned, and has no intention of owning
assets in Ontario. Second, Chevron conducts no business in Ontario. Third, there
is no basis for asserting that Chevron Canada's assets are Chevron's assets for
588 [VOL. 50:-583
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of Appeal disagreed with the motion judge's ruling, holding that this
was not an appropriate case in which to impose a stay. 16 On the
jurisdictional issue with respect to Chevron, the Court of Appeal held
that Ontario had jurisdiction over the action. There was no
requirement for there to be a real and substantial connection between
Ontario and the judgment debtor, Chevron;1 7 the only requirement was
that there was a real and substantial connection between the judgment
court (Ecuador) and the defendant or the subject matter of the
dispute.18 With respect to Chevron Canada, the Court of Appeal found
that, in light of its bricks-and-mortar business in Ontario and its
significant relationship with Chevron, an Ontario court had
jurisdiction to adjudicate a recognition and enforcement action
against it.19
Thus, there were two jurisdictional questions that the Supreme
Court of Canada was called upon to resolve in Chevron. First, in an
action to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, did there need to
be a real and substantial connection between the judgment debtor,
Chevron, and the forum? Or, was it sufficient for jurisdictional
purposes that Chevron had exigible assets in Ontario? Second, how is
jurisdiction to be assessed over a non-party to the original action
(Chevron Canada)?
With respect to the first issue, the Supreme Court of Canada held
that jurisdiction over Chevron was established by virtue of service ex
juris under Rule 17.02(m).2 0 Rule 17.02(m) provides that "[a] party to
a proceeding may, without a court order, be served outside Ontario
with an originating process or notice of a reference where the
proceeding against the party consists of a claim or claims . . . on a
judgment of a court outside Ontario." 21 According to the Court, in
actions to recognize and enforce a foreign judgment, "it is the act of
service on the basis of a foreign judgment that grants an Ontario court
jurisdiction over the defendant." 22 The Court clarified that, with
respect to enforcement actions, the additional hurdle of establishing a
the purposes of satisfying the Ecuadorian judgment. Chevron does not own
Chevron Canada's shares. Nor is there a legal basis for piercing Chevron
Canada's corporate veil. In the judge's view, even though "[i]mportant
considerations of international comity accompany any request for the recognition
of a judgment rendered by a foreign court . . . , [t]he evidence [in this case]
disclosed that there is nothing in Ontario to fight over", and thus no reason to
allow the claim to proceed any further.
Id.
16. Id. at para. 18.
17. Id. at para. 20.
18. Id. at paras. 20-21.
19. Id. at para. 22.
20. Id. at para. 76.
21. Rules of Civil Procedure, R.S.O. 1990, Reg. 194, 17.02(m) (Can.).
22. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 27.
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real and substantial connection between the judgment debtor and the
forum was not necessary. The only jurisdictional prerequisite is that
the foreign court issuing the judgment had to have a real and
substantial connection with either the defendant or the subject matter
of the dispute. 23 The Court justified this conclusion on four bases:
First, this Court has rightly never imposed a requirement to prove a real and
substantial connection between the defendant or the dispute and the province in
actions to recognize and enforce foreign judgments. Second, the distinct
principles that underlie actions for recognition and enforcement as opposed to
actions at first instance support this position. Third, the experiences of other
jurisdictions, convincing academic commentary, and the fact that comparable
statutory provisions exist in provincial legislation reinforce this approach.
Finally, practical considerations militate against adopting Chevron's submission
[that a real and substantial connection between Chevron and Ontario is
required].24
The Court further noted that there is a "crucial difference"
between an action at first instance and one seeking recognition and
enforcement of a foreign judgment in that "the only purpose of the
[latter] is to allow a pre-existing obligation to be fulfilled." 25 The Court
emphasized that, in recognition actions, "the enforcing court's role is
not one of substance, but [] instead one of facilitation." 26 Accordingly,
the Court held that the Ontario court had jurisdiction over the
judgment debtor because Chevron was properly served on the basis of
a foreign judgment; no additional showing of a real and substantial
connection between Chevron and Ontario was necessary.2 7
The litigation, however, also involved Chevron Canada: the
plaintiffs argued that the assets of Chevron's subsidiary, Chevron
Canada, should be used to satisfy the judgment against Chevron. Thus,
the Supreme Court of Canada had to consider on what basis Ontario
could assume jurisdiction over Chevron Canada. Clearly, Rule
17.02(m) (service out of Ontario on the basis of a foreign judgment)
could not be used to establish jurisdiction, since Chevron Canada was
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at para. 42.
26. Id. at para. 44. See also id. at para. 48 ("No concern about the legitimacy of
the exercise of state power exists in actions to recognize and enforce foreign judgments
against judgment debtors. As I have explained, when such an action comes before a
Canadian court, the court is not assuming jurisdiction over the parties in the same way
as would occur in a first instance case. The enforcing court has no interest in adjudicating
the original rights of the parties. Rather, the court merely seeks to assist in the
enforcement of what has already been decided in another forum. As Deschamps J. aptly
stated in Pro Swing, "[t]he enforcing court ... lends its judicial assistance to the foreign
litigant by allowing him or her to use its enforcement mechanisms[.]" The manner in
which the court exercises control over the parties is thus different-and far less
invasive-than in an action at first instance.") (internal citations omitted).
27. See id. at paras. 87, 89.
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not a party to the original Ecuadorian action. The Court ultimately
held that Ontario had jurisdiction over Chevron Canada because
Chevron Canada was properly served in juris under Rule 16.28
According to the Court, because jurisdiction was premised on Chevron
Canada's presence in Ontario, there was no need to resort to the real
and substantial connection test to establish jurisdiction. 29
The Court confirmed that the traditional grounds for
jurisdiction-presence and consent-continued to apply irrespective of
the real and substantial connection test.3 0 It noted that "Van Breda
specifically preserved the traditional jurisdictional grounds of presence
and consent."31 The Court further elaborated that,
[w]hile Van Breda simplified, justified, and explained many critical aspects of
Canadian private international law, it did not purport to displace the traditional
jurisdictional grounds. LeBel J. explicitly stated that, in addition to the
connecting factors he established for assumed jurisdiction, "jurisdiction may also
be based on traditional grounds, like the defendant's presence in the jurisdiction
or consent to submit to the court's jurisdiction, if they are established[.]" In other
words, "[t]he real and substantial connection test does not oust the traditional
private international law bases for court jurisdiction."32
The Court referenced the longstanding history of the presence
rule, stating that "its historical roots 'cannot be over-emphasized."' 3 3 It
then provided a statement of the presence rule and explained how the
rule differs from jurisdiction based on the real and substantial
connection test:
[Presence-based jurisdiction] is based upon the requirement and sufficiency of
personal service of the originating process within the province or territory of the
forum (service in juris). If service is properly effected on a person who is in the
forum at the time of the action, the court has jurisdiction regardless of the nature
of the cause of action. Assumed jurisdiction, for its part, emerged much later and
developed through the adoption of rules for service ex juris. When a court finds
that it has jurisdiction on this basis, that jurisdiction is limited to the specific
action at issue before it.34
28. See id. at para. 94.
29. Id. at para. 89.
30. Chevron Canada had tried arguing that the real and substantial connection
test was applicable and that it rebutted the presumption of jurisdiction that arises from
carrying on business. The Court explained "[i]n Chevron Canada's view, carrying on
business from an office is only a presumptive connecting factor that can be rebutted by
showing that there is no connection between the claim and the business the corporation
conducts in the province." Id. at para. 79.
31. Id. at para. 81.
32. Id. at para. 84 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 83 (quoting Stephen G. A. Pitel & Cheryl D. Dusten, Lost in Transition:
Answering the Questions Raised by the Supreme Court of Canada's New Approach to
Jurisdiction, 85 CAN. BAR REV. 61, 69 (2006)).
34. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 83 (citations omitted).
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The Court noted that to actually establish presence-based
jurisdiction, a corporate defendant must be "carrying on business in
the forum at the time of the action."3 5 The inquiry into whether a
corporation is carrying on business is necessarily a fact intensive one. 36
It observed that the "maintenance of physical business premises" is a
compelling indicator of business presence.3 7 The Court also expressed
support for the proposition that the "degree of business activity [be]
sustained for a period of time."38
The Court then purported to apply the presence-based jurisdiction
rule to Chevron Canada. It repeated the motion judge's findings with
respect to Chevron Canada's business presence in Ontario:
Chevron Canada operates a business establishment in Mississauga, Ontario. It
is not a mere 'virtual' business. It runs a bricks and mortar office from which it
carries out a non-transitory business with human means and its Ontario staff
provides services to and solicits sales from its customers in this province.39
Given that these findings had not been contested, the Court
concluded that these factual connections to Ontario were sufficient to
establish presence-based jurisdiction over Chevron Canada.40 In the
Court's words,
Chevron Canada has a physical office in Mississauga, Ontario, where it was
served pursuant to rule 16.02(1)(c), which provides that valid service can be
made at a place of business in Ontario. Chevron Canada's business activities at
this office are sustained; it has representatives who provide services to customers
in the province.41
The Court further observed that "Canadian courts have found that
jurisdiction exists in such circumstances," citing a variety of cases. 42
35. Id. at para. 85.
36. Id. Whether a corporation is "carrying on business" in the province is a
question of fact. See Wilson v. Hull (1995), 174 A.R. 81 (C.A.), at para. 52; Ingersoll
Packing Co. v. New York Central & Hudson River R.R. Co. (1918), 42 O.L.R. 330, 337
(S.C. App. Div.).
37. Id. at para. 85. The Court noted "LeBel J. accepted this in Van Breda when
he held that 'carrying on business requires some form of actual, not only virtual, presence
in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining an office there."' Id.
38. Id. (citations omitted). In Wilson, the Alberta Court of Appeal was asked to
assess whether a company was carrying on business in the jurisdiction in the context of
statutory registration of a foreign judgment. It held that to make this determination, the
court must inquire into whether the company has "'some direct or indirect presence in
the state asserting jurisdiction, accompanied by a degree of business activity which is
sustained for a period of time."' Id. (quoting Wilson, 174 A.R. at para. 13).
39. Id. at para. 86 (quoting motion judge's factual findings concerning Chevron
Canada's Mississauga office).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Incorporated Broadcasters Ltd. v. Canwest Global Comm. Corp.
(2003), 63 O.R. 3d 431, para. 36 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Prince v. ACE Aviation Holdings and
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The Court then determined that its holding on presence-based
jurisdiction concluded the inquiry.43 No further resort to the real and
substantial connection test was warranted. In this respect, the Court
stated that
[t]he motion judge's analysis was correct, and the Ontario Court of Appeal had
no need to go beyond these considerations to find jurisdiction. As several lower
courts have noted both prior to and since Van Breda, where jurisdiction stems
from the defendant's presence in the jurisdiction, there is no need to consider
whether a real and substantial connection exists . . . . In other words, the
question of whether jurisdiction exists over Chevron Canada should begin and
end with traditional, presence-based jurisdiction in this case.44
Nonetheless, since Chevron Canada had "add[ed] constitutional
flavour to its submissions," the Court went further and explained why
the constitutional principle of real and substantial connection4 5 did not
mandate a different result in this case. In Van Breda, the Court
emphasized that the real and substantial connection test, as a
constitutional rule, ensured that the assertion of jurisdiction over a
defendant would be legitimate. 46 The Court then stated that the real
and substantial connection test as a constitutional principle does not
mean that it is "illegitimate" to assert jurisdiction over Chevron
Canada. 47 It continued:
Chevron Canada has elected to establish and continue to operate a place of
business in Mississauga, Ontario, at which it was served. It should therefore
have expected that it might one day be called upon to answer to an Ontario
court's request that it defend against an action. If a defendant maintains a place
of business in Ontario, it is reasonable to say that the Ontario courts have an
interest in the defendant and the disputes in which it becomes involved.48
Air Canada (2013), 115 O.R. 3d 721, para. 14 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), appeal dismissed
and cross-appeal allowed (2014) 120 O.R. 3d 140 (Can. Ont. C.A.); Abdula v. Canadian
Solar Inc. (2011), 92 B.L.R. 4th 324 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.), aff'd, (2012), 110 O.R. 3d 256
(Can. Ont. C.A.); Wilson v. Hull (1995), 174 A.R. 81 (Can. Alta. C.A.); Charron v. Banque
provinciale du Canada, [1936] O.W.N. 315 (Can. Ont. H.C.J.)).
43. See id. at para. 87.
44. Id. (citations omitted).
45. Id. at para. 88. As distinct from the real and substantial connection
articulated as a conflict of laws rule in Van Breda. See Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda,
[2012] 1 S.C.R. 572, paras. 42-50 (Can.) [hereinafter Van Breda].
46. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 89. The Chevron court explained:
As noted in my discussion of Chevron, LeBel J. articulated this constitutional
principle as suggesting that "the connection between a state and a dispute cannot
be weak or hypothetical", as such a connection "would cast doubt upon the
legitimacy of the exercise of state power over the persons affected by the dispute."
Id. at para. 88.
47. Id. at para. 89 (emphasis in original).
48. Id.
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The Court then reiterated its original conclusion that Ontario
courts had presence-based jurisdiction over Chevron Canada and that
the real and substantial connection test articulated in Van Breda was
not applicable. 49 To resort to Van Breda in this context "would be to
permit a total conflation of presence-based and assumed
jurisdiction."5 0
III. DECONSTRUCTING CHEVRON
This Article focuses on the second issue that the Supreme Court
of Canada addressed in Chevron: the use of presence as a basis for
jurisdiction over a corporation.5 1 It is critical to note that, even though
the Court's discussion of presence-based jurisdiction took place in the
context of an enforcement proceeding, its holding applies with equal
force to an action at first instance. 52 Accordingly, the Chevron case
must be read to stand for the proposition that if a corporation is
carrying on business and is served with process in a particular
province, then that province can assume jurisdiction over the
corporation. That jurisdiction is, to use the American terminology,
general jurisdiction-jurisdiction in respect of any and all claims
against the corporation, not simply those claims that arise from or
relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum.5 3 Although
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. It is not clear whether, or how, these principles are to apply to other business
entities (e.g., partnerships, associations, cooperatives, and sole proprietorships).
52. See id. at paras. 24, 27. See also Tanya J. Monestier, Jurisdiction and the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 42 ADVOC. Q. 107, 110-11 (2013):
Even though the real and substantial connection test originated in the judgment
enforcement context, it also became the touchstone for jurisdiction over ex juris
defendants in general. In other words, the real and substantial connection test
that was developed to expand the potential grounds of jurisdiction for
enforcement purposes soon became the litmus test for "regular" jurisdictional
analysis as well. The complementarity of the jurisdictional test was telegraphed
in Morguard itself when Justice La Forest stated that "the taking of jurisdiction
by a court in one province and its recognition in another must be viewed as
correlatives." Given the correlative nature of the jurisdictional test (i.e., the idea
that judicial jurisdiction is the same on the "front end" as on the "back end"), it
became increasingly important for courts to be mindful of how developments in
the law of jurisdiction on the front end would impact the law of jurisdiction on
the back end and vice versa.
(citations omitted).
53. See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate:
A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966):
In American thinking, affiliations between the forum and the underlying
controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues
deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes
jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction. On the other hand,
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commentators have focused on various aspects of the Chevron decision
(including its implications for the enforcement of judgments and for the
doctrine of separate corporate personality), it is arguably the Court's
explicit endorsement of presence-based jurisdiction over corporations
that has the greatest potential to wreak havoc in the case law.
A close examination of the Court's judgment in Chevron reveals
that authority for the proposition that courts can exercise presence-
based jurisdiction over a corporation is decidedly absent. The Court
essentially offers two sources of support for presence-based
jurisdiction: "historical roots" and case law. 54 The Court in Chevron
emphasizes repeatedly that presence is a "traditional" basis of
jurisdiction. 55 It cites an article by Stephen Pitel and Cheryl Dusten to
the effect that presence-based jurisdiction has been around for decades
and that its historical lineage "cannot be over-emphasized."5 6 Nowhere
in the judgment, however, does it actually explain what that historical
lineage is as applied to corporations.
It is true that presence-based jurisdiction is a well-established and
traditional form of jurisdiction for natural persons. Thus, when a
person is served with process while in the forum, the court is said to
have personal jurisdiction over him. 57 In fact, the Supreme Court of
Canada cites one of my own previous articles for this proposition: "[i]f
service is properly effected on a person who is in the forum at the time
of the action, the court has jurisdiction regardless of the nature of the
cause of action."5 8 Notably, I used the word person-meaning natural
person-when referring to presence-based jurisdiction. The rule that
natural persons are subject to personal jurisdiction if they are served
with process while in the forum certainly has its critics,5 9 but it is an
accepted and internationally-recognized form of jurisdiction. 60
American practice for the most part is to exercise power to adjudicate any kind
of controversy when jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect,
between the forum and the person or persons whose legal rights are to be
affected. This we call general jurisdiction.
54. See Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 83.
55. Id. at paras. 3, 27, 29, 30, 79, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 90, 91, 95.
56. Id. at para. 83 (emphasis in original) (citing Pitel & Dusten, supra note 33,
at 69).
57. See Maharanee Seethadevi Gaekwar of Baroda v. Wildenstein [1972] 2 QB
283 at 289-90 (Eng.); Burnham v. Superior Ct. of Cal., Cty. of Marin, 495 U.S. 604, 619
(1990).
58. See Tanya J. Monestier, (Still) a 'Real and Substantial' Mess: The Law of
Jurisdiction in Canada, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396, 449 (2013).
59. See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, The Irrepressible Myth of Burnham and Its
Increasing Indefensibility After Goodyear and Daimler, 15 NEV. L. J. 1203, 1233 (2015);
Paul R. Dubinsky, Is Transnational Litigation a Distinct Field? The Persistence of
Exceptionalism in American Procedural Law, 44 STAN. J. INT'L L. 301, 331-32 (2008).
60. See, e.g., Burnham, 496 U.S. at 619.
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The same cannot be said for presence-based jurisdiction over
corporations. There is very little support in the Canadian case law for
the proposition that service of process on a corporation that is carrying
on business in the forum confers jurisdiction over the corporation. The
Supreme Court cites five cases in support of its conclusion that
presence-based jurisdiction applies to corporations: Incorporated
Broadcasters Ltd. v. Canwest Global Communications Corp.,61 Prince
v. ACE Aviation Holdings Inc., 62 Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc., 63
Wilson v. Hull,64 and Charron v. Banque provinciale du Canada.6 5
None of these cases, however, stands for the proposition that courts can
exercise presence-based jurisdiction over a corporation.
A. Incorporated Broadcasters Ltd. v. Canwest Global
Communications Corp.
In Incorporated Broadcasters-the first case cited by the Supreme
Court of Canada-the Ontario Court of Appeal did purport to apply its
understanding of presence-based jurisdiction to various corporate
defendants. From an analysis of the case, however, it appears that the
Court of Appeal did not fully understand or appreciate what was meant
by presence-based jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal cited Muscutt v.
Courcelles66 for the proposition that there are three different ways to
establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant: (1) presence-based
jurisdiction, (2) consent-based jurisdiction, and (3) assumed
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal noted that "[p]resence-based
jurisdiction permits jurisdiction over an extra -provincial defendant
who is physically present within the territory of the court." 67 The
quoted passage from Muscutt is inaccurate. It is not that "[p]resence-
based jurisdiction permits jurisdiction over an extra-provincial
defendant who is physically present within the territory of the court";
it is that "[p]resence-based jurisdiction permits jurisdiction over an
extra-provincial defendant who is physically present within the
territory of the court" when served with process.68 This latter qualifier
is critical. A person is not subject to presence-based jurisdiction simply
because he is in the forum-it is the act of serving process on that
person, while he is in the forum, that confers presence-based
jurisdiction. If a person from Ontario, for instance, travels to Manitoba
and gets into a car accident there, he is not automatically subject to the
61. Incorporated Broadcasters, 63 O.R. 3d at para. 36.
62. Prince, 115 O.R. 3d at para. 14.
63. Abdula, 92 B.L.R. 4th at 324.
64. Wilson, 174 A.R. 81 at para. 13.
65. Charron, O.W.N. 315.
66. Muscutt et al. v. Courcelles et al. (2002), 60 O.R. 3d 20 at para. 19.
67. Incorporated Broadcasters, 63 O.R. 3d at para. 29.
68. Id. (quoting Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d at para. 19).
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jurisdiction of the Manitoba courts because he is physically present
there. Only if he is served with process while he is in the province will
Manitoba courts have personal jurisdiction over him based on
presence.6 9
The Ontario Court of Appeal in Incorporated Broadcasters
articulated the rule with respect to presence-based jurisdiction two
more times without the important qualifier regarding service of
process: "[w]here the defendant is within the jurisdiction, the court has
jurisdiction over the person"; 7 0 and "[t]here is no constitutional
impediment to a court asserting jurisdiction over a person having a
presence in the province."7 1 The Court of Appeal then stated that "with
the exception of Mr. Asper, all of the defendants have a presence in
Ontario that makes them subject to the jurisdiction of the Ontario
courts."7 2 Notably, the Court of Appeal claimed that the defendants
had "a presence in Ontario," not that the defendants had a presence in
Ontario and that they were served with process in Ontario. The Court
of Appeal explained the nature of the presence for each of the four
corporate defendants:
CanWest Global is a federally incorporated corporation with its registered office
in Winnipeg. However, it carries on business in Ontario in television,
newspapers, and radio, specialty cable channels and Internet websites. By
choosing to carry on business in Ontario, CanWest Global is subject to the
jurisdiction of Ontario courts. The defendants Global Television and Global
Communications Limited are federally incorporated corporations with registered
offices in Ontario carrying on business in Ontario. By virtue of their place of
registered office and where they carry on business they are resident in Ontario
and therefore subject to the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts. The defendant
CanVideo Television Sales (1983) Limited was originally an Ontario corporation
and is now a federally incorporated corporation and carries on business from
offices in Toronto and is subject to the jurisdiction of the Ontario courts. The
defendant CanWest Global Broadcasting Inc. is a federal corporation with its
registered office in Quebec but with offices in Toronto. It too is subject to the
jurisdiction of Ontario courts.73
The Ontario Court of Appeal carefully pointed out that the various
defendants were carrying on business in Ontario-but nowhere did the
court say that each of these corporate defendants was served with
process at their Ontario business establishment (as opposed to, say, at
their extra-provincial head office). 74 In fact, its statements suggest that
the very fact of carrying on business is what gave the Ontario court
jurisdiction (irrespective of where the corporation was served). For
69. Importantly, they likely also have jurisdiction based on a real and
substantial connection.
70. Incorporated Broadcasters, 63 O.R. 3d at para. 30.
71. Id. at para. 33.
72. Id. at para. 36.
73. Id. (citations omitted).
74. It is possible, if not likely, that each of the defendants was served ex juris.
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instance, the Court of Appeal pronounced that "[b]y choosing to carry
on business in Ontario, CanWest Global is subject to the jurisdiction of
Ontario courts."75 Again, simply carrying on business in Ontario is not
what the Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron said constitutes
presence-based jurisdiction; rather, presence-based jurisdiction arises
from the combination of carrying on business and being served with
process in that jurisdiction.76 The passage where the Court of Appeal
elaborates upon why jurisdiction is appropriate does not contain any
reference to service of process. In fact, no mention is made of service of
process on the corporations in the entire judgment.
The Ontario Court of Appeal then considered whether there was
presence-based jurisdiction over the only natural person defendant in
the action, Mr. Asper." The Court of Appeal's comments with respect
to Mr. Asper make it painfully obvious that it was not referring to
presence-based jurisdiction as the Supreme Court of Canada has
defined that term in Chevron. The Ontario Court of Appeal stated that
Mr. Asper resides in Manitoba. For the purposes of this discussion I will assume
that he was properly served in Ontario. Whether served in or out of Ontario, since
he is an extra-provincial defendant, Ontario courts only have jurisdiction over
him if the real and substantial connection test is met.78
This passage evidences that the Court of Appeal in Incorporated
Broadcasters profoundly misunderstands presence as a basis for
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal assumes that the individual
defendant was served with process while in Ontario-and yet,
concludes that there is no presence-based jurisdiction over him because
the defendant is extra-provincial (i.e., is resident somewhere else). The
definition of presence-based jurisdiction that the Supreme Court of
Canada in Chevron provides-service with process while physically in
the jurisdiction-is the exact scenario that the Court of Appeal in
Incorporated Broadcasters says is not presence-based jurisdiction.
Clearly, the Court of Appeal in Incorporated Broadcasters had a very
different understanding of presence-based jurisdiction than the
Supreme Court in Chevron. Accordingly, Incorporated Broadcasters is
a very poor authority for the Supreme Court of Canada to have used in
justifying its notion of presence-based jurisdiction (for either natural
persons or corporations).7 9
75. Incorporated Broadcasters, 63 O.R. 3d at para. 36.
76. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 94.
77. Incorporated Broadcasters, 63 O.R. 3d at para. 37.
78. Id. (emphasis added).
79. The error made by Incorporated Broadcasters in omitting the critical element
of a corporation being served in the jurisdiction (in addition to carrying on business
there) has been replicated in the case law. For instance, in Danks v. Ioli Management
Consulting, 2003 CarswellOnt 3975 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) the action was commenced
by way of service ex juris on the corporation in Virginia under rules 17.02(f)(i), (iv) and
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B. Prince v. ACE Aviation Holdings Inc.
Similarly, Prince does not provide authority for the proposition
that a court can exercise presence-based jurisdiction over a company.
The extent of the discussion on the jurisdictional issue in Prince is as
follows: "Air Canada concedes that it is present and carries on
significant business in Ontario. There is no question that this court has
jurisdiction over Air Canada. This court has presence-based
jurisdiction."8 0 The Ontario Superior Court of Justice cited Van Breda
and Incorporated Broadcasters for this proposition. Nothing about this
passage suggests that this court's understanding of presence-based
jurisdiction supports the Supreme Court of Canada's understanding of
presence-based jurisdiction in Chevron. Specifically, it is not known
whether Air Canada was served with process in Ontario or whether it
was served ex juris and the Ontario court is using the mere fact of
carrying on business to say that there is presence-based jurisdiction
over Air Canada.
C. Abdula v. Canadian Solar Inc.
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Canadian Solar appears
to make the same mistake as the Ontario Court of Appeal in
Incorporated Broadcasters: interpreting presence-based jurisdiction to
mean that jurisdiction is appropriate where there is a significant
presence in the jurisdiction (without the requirement that service of
process take place in the jurisdiction). The'court stated, for instance,
"[Incorporated Broadcasters] and Momentous.ca make[] it clear that
the real and substantial connection test has no application to
(h). The corporation was not served in Ontario. Despite this critical fact, the court
entertained arguments about presence-based jurisdiction.
The defendant is a Virginia incorporated company. Its head office is in Virginia.
Its only office premises are in Virginia. There is no office or place of business in
Ontario. It is clearly a resident of Virginia. In my view, the fact that some of the
defendant's clients are in Ontario and that its consultants attend at client sites
in Ontario to provide consulting services for specific projects, does not give the
defendant a physical "presence" in Ontario. In my view this does not constitute
"carrying on business" in Ontario in the sense that Canwest Global was carrying
on its substantial communications business in Ontario in the Incorporated
Broadcasters case.
Id. at para. 9. While the court ultimately came to the conclusion that Ontario did not
have presence-based jurisdiction over the corporate defendant, it failed to recognize that
presence-based jurisdiction is not even an option in cases where the corporation is served
ex juris. This case, like Incorporated Broadcasters, reveals that Canadian courts are
misunderstanding what presence-based jurisdiction over corporations entails, believing
that corporate presence alone (regardless of service of process) can suffice to ground
jurisdiction.
80. Prince, 115 O.R. 3d at para. 14.
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defendants who have a presence in the jurisdiction."8 1 In applying its
view of presence-based jurisdiction to the facts, the court held that
Canadian Solar is a federally incorporated company with executive offices in
Kitchener and which carries on business in Ontario. It has held its annual
meeting in Ontario. The press releases which the plaintiff alleges contained
misrepresentations were issued in Ontario. As the defendants concede in their
Factum, "Canadian Solar has Canada written all over it." Accordingly, I find it
unnecessary to analyze issues such as where the alleged misrepresentation was
made or received or where reliance on the alleged misrepresentation
occurred. Canadian Solar has significant connections to Ontario. Therefore, as
stated by Rosenberg J.A. in [Incorporated Broadcasters] "Where the defendant is
within the jurisdiction, the court has jurisdiction over the person." On this basis
I find that this court has jurisdiction over the claim for negligent
misrepresentation. 82
As with Prince, the court in Canadian Solar relies primarily on
Incorporated Broadcasters. Again, there is no indication that the court
in Canadian Solar shares the Supreme Court of Canada's
understanding of presence-based jurisdiction.
D. Wilson v. Hull
Wilson pre-dates Incorporated Broadcasters, but still does not lend
support to the idea that Canadian courts have endorsed presence-
based jurisdiction over corporations. In fact, it is unclear how Wilson
even remotely supports the proposition that Canadian courts have
recognized presence-based jurisdiction over corporations. Wilson
involved an action in Alberta to enforce an Idaho default judgment. A
statute in force in Alberta at the time provided that a foreign judgment
would not be enforced in Alberta unless the judgment debtor was
carrying on business in the foreign jurisdiction (Idaho) at the time of
the commencement of the action.83 The court then described what
carrying on business meant in the context of the Alberta recognition
statute. Nothing in the Wilson case can be extrapolated to support the
very different proposition that a Canadian court has jurisdiction over
a corporation that carries on business in the jurisdiction and is served
with process in juris at that place of business.
E. Charron v. Banque provinciale du Canada
Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada references an eighty-year-
old case in support of its contention that presence-based jurisdiction
81. Abdula, 92 B.L.R. 4th at 19.
82. Id. at paras. 21-22 (emphasis in original).
83. The statute in Wilson provided a simplified procedure for registering foreign
judgments and thus imposed requirements that were more stringent than the real and
substantial connection test. See 174 A.R. at para. 19.
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over a corporation is a well-established feature of Canadian law.
Charron involved an action initiated in Ontario for professional
negligence against a Qu6bec bank. 84 The defendant bank argued that
there was no jurisdiction in Ontario because the land that was the
subject matter of the dispute was located in Qu6bec, both the plaintiff
and defendant were domiciled in Qu6bec, and the dispute was governed
by Qu6bec law.8 5 The plaintiff argued that, because the defendant bank
had a branch in Ontario, Ontario had personal jurisdiction over the
action.86
The Court focused on the question of where the defendant was
resident. It quoted English authorities to the effect that "[t]he
residence of a defendant in a country at the time when an action is
commenced against him is an admitted ground of jurisdiction."8 7 After
looking at several authorities on the residence of a bank and its
branches, the court concluded that "[t]he defendant has a residence
within Ontario, separate from that of its Head Office in Montreal,
sufficient to bring the defendant within the jurisdiction of this
Court."8 8 The Court did not state that, because the bank was carrying
on business in Ontario, the bank would be subject to personal
jurisdiction in Ontario.
Presumably, there is a difference between carrying on business
and residence. In Van Breda, the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to
imply that residence was synonymous with domicile, as it listed both
of these together as the first presumptive connecting factor under the
real and substantial connection test.8 9 Moreover, it is not clear from
the Charron case whether service was effected on the bank in juris in
Ontario or ex juris in Qu6bec. If service was effected ex juris, based on
the fact that the bank had a branch in Ontario, then the case is wholly
inapposite. Chevron stands for the proposition that the act of service
on a corporation in a place where it is carrying on business suffices to
ground jurisdiction there. In short, too much stock should not be placed
in an eighty-year-old case that purports to pinpoint the residence of a
bank for jurisdictional purposes and says nothing specifically about
carrying on business as a basis for jurisdiction.
F. Summary
None of these cases supports the proposition that the Supreme
Court of Canada claims they do: that "Canadian courts have found that
84. Charron, O.W.N. 315.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. (quoting A.V. DICEY, JOHN H.C. MORRIS & LAWRENCE COLLINS, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 403 (5th ed. 1932)).
88. Id.
89. Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at para. 86.
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jurisdiction exists in . . . circumstances" where a corporate defendant
is carrying on business in the forum and is served with process there.90
Incorporated Broadcasters shows that courts are confused about what
presence-based jurisdiction is and how it applies both to individuals
and to corporations. Importantly, Incorporated Broadcasters
conceptualizes presence-based jurisdiction as simply requiring a
corporation's presence in the jurisdiction, regardless of where that
corporation was served with process. Prince and Canadian Solar
replicate the mistake made in Incorporated Broadcasters by omitting
the service in juris component of the presence-based jurisdiction rule.
Wilson dealt with what carrying on business meant for the purpose of
an enforcement statute and, accordingly, does not lend any support to
the proposition that Canadian courts have recognized presence-based
jurisdiction over corporations. And Charron, while it provides some
support for presence-based jurisdiction, must be read with skepticism
owing to its age and its focus on the residence of a defendant bank.
Moreover, if presence-based jurisdiction over corporations were so
longstanding and prevalent, there would be more than a handful of
cases that discuss and apply it. Similarly, a significant number of cases
would rely on presence as a basis of jurisdiction, given how easy it is to
serve a corporation where it is doing business.91 The dearth of case law
is surprising given how well-established this ground of jurisdiction is
90. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 86.
91. Take, for instance, the Supreme Court decision in Unifund Assurance Co. v.
Insurance Corp. of British Columbia, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 63 (Can.). In that case, the Court
premised jurisdiction in Ontario on Unifund's attornment to the jurisdiction of the
Ontario courts. However, Justice Bastarache at one point stated that Unifund was
carrying on business in Ontario. As Edinger and Black point out, if this is true, then the
basis of jurisdiction should have been presence and not attornment:
We suggest that such blurring is unfortunate and improper, and that Bastarache
J.'s one-sentence assertion that Unifund was carrying on business in Ontario is
wrong, or at least at odds with the rest of his judgment. A corporation that is
carrying on business in a jurisdiction is held to be present there, and such
presence - or, more accurately, service on that corporation while it is present -
gives rise to general personal jurisdiction over that defendant. That is, if
someone is served while present in a common law province then that province's
courts have jurisdiction regardless of the subject-matter of the suit (providing, of
course, that there are no objections to the suit on grounds of subject-matter
jurisdiction, e.g. that it concerns title to real property located outside the
province). Thus, if ICBC was carrying on business in Ontario, anyone would be
able to assert Ontario jurisdiction over it with regard to any matter. But that
conclusion is at odds with the remainder of Bastarache J.'s judgment. Thus, in
light of the fact that the bulk of his reasoning on the jurisdictional point focuses
on attornment by agreement (which, of course, can be for limited purposes), his
one-sentence assertion that ICBC was carrying on business in Ontario must be
seen to have at best a peripheral status.
Elizabeth Edinger & Vaughan Black, A New Approach to Extraterritoriality: Unifund
Assurance Co. v. I.C.B.C., 40 CAN. BUS. L.J. 161, 170 n.20 (2004).
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purported to be. 92 Tag jurisdiction over corporations seems to be
Canada's best-kept secret.
In reality, Canadian courts have never examined in any detail
what presence means in the context of a corporation. To be sure, there
are a number of references to "presence-based jurisdiction" and
"presence as a traditional basis for jurisdiction" in the case law, but
there is little elaboration beyond that.93 This is particularly startling
given that U.S. courts have been struggling to define and refine the
concept of corporate presence for over a hundred years. Canadian
courts seem to have uncritically assumed that the same presence
principles that apply to a natural person can automatically be
transposed onto a corporation. But they cannot-and should not-
without deliberate forethought. Corporations are not human beings
that are capable of being personally served while physically present in
a jurisdiction. A process server cannot physically put a statement of
claim into the hands of a corporation, as it can for an individual. 94
92. Lixo Investments Ltd. v. Gowling, Lafleur, Henderson and Guy Poitras, 2013
ONSC 4862 illustrates the principle that presence-based jurisdiction is not a well-
established feature of the Canadian jurisdictional landscape. In Lixo, the plaintiff
initiated an action for professional negligence in Ontario against the defendant law firm
and one of its partners. The law firm, Gowlings, had offices in both Ontario and Qubbec.
While the facts do not indicate where Gowlings was served with process, the court
proceeded to apply the Van Breda test for assumed jurisdiction, concluding that
jurisdiction was appropriate because Gowlings carried on business in Ontario. Id. at
para. 17 ("It is clear that Gowlings carries on business in Ontario."). If Gowlings carried
on business in Ontario (a fact that could hardly be disputed), why did the court not
simply say that it had presence-based jurisdiction? Why, in other words, did the court
have to resort to the real and substantial connection test? This case demonstrates that
sophisticated litigants (or more specifically, their legal counsel) are simply not aware
that service of process on a corporation that is carrying on business confers jurisdiction
over that corporation.
93. Importantly, even those cases that reference presence-based jurisdiction over
corporations fail to recognize that it is the act of service of process in the province at the
place where the corporation is carrying on business that confers jurisdiction. Most courts
simply refer to the corporation's general presence in the province as a basis for
jurisdiction, not appreciating the vital distinction between service in juris (which would
support presence-based jurisdiction) and service ex juris (which would support assumed
jurisdiction). See, e.g., Carrera v. Coalcorp Mining Inc., 2009 CarswellOnt 3859 (Can.
Ont. S.C.) (raising the possibility of presence-based jurisdiction over corporate
defendants that had been served ex juris); Williams v. Fed. Plastics Mfg. Ltd., 2007
CarswellOnt 4350 (Can. Ont. S.C.) (discussing presence-based jurisdiction as a
possibility where it appeared that the defendant had been served ex juris); ABN Amro
Bank N.V. v. BCE Inc., 2003 CarswellOnt 2890 (Can. Ont. S.C.) (finding that the Ontario
court had presence-based jurisdiction over the defendant, but then proceeding to state
that the Ontario court also had assumed jurisdiction).
94. Steven Mathew Wald, The Left-for-Dead Fiction of Corporate Presence: Is It
Revived by Burnham?, 54 LA. L. REV. 187, 187 (1993) ("It is essential to distinguish
between individuals and corporations because the intangible quality of corporations
makes it much more difficult to determine when and where a corporation is 'present'; in
contrast, individuals are present wherever they may be found."); J.J. Fawcett, A New
Approach to Jurisdiction over Companies in Private International Law, 37 INT'L & COMP.
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What presence means for a corporation is a very important question,
given the very significant consequences that flow from the assertion of
presence-based jurisdiction: jurisdiction for any claim brought by any
plaintiff based on any cause of action arising anywhere in the world.
IV. CONCEPTUAL PROBLEMS WITH PRESENCE-BASED JURISDICTION
OVER CORPORATIONS
Aside from the fact that the Supreme Court of Canada cites no
compelling authority for the proposition that simply serving a
corporation that is carrying on business with service of process in juris
confers jurisdiction, there are several conceptual problems with this
particular view of presence-based jurisdiction over corporations. First,
the Court has created an exceptionally low standard for a corporation
to be carrying on business. This low standard means that provincial
courts will have universal jurisdiction over many corporations-
something the Court appeared concerned about in Van Breda. Second,
the Court's endorsement of presence-based jurisdiction means that
resorting to the real and substantial connection test is now
unnecessary in many cases. Third, the Court's decisions in Chevron
and Van Breda are an uncomfortable fit. In particular, Van Breda's
presumptive connecting factor that looks to whether the corporation
was carrying on business in a province is now a nullity.
A. Chevron's Low Standard for Carrying On Business Means that
Canadian Courts Have Universal Jurisdiction over Many
Corporations
1. Chevron Has Created a Very Low Standard for Carrying On
Business
The Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron created a very low
standard for carrying on business in a province. It found that presence-
based jurisdiction over Chevron Canada existed simply because
Chevron Canada was served with process at a "bricks and mortar office
from which it carrie[d] out a non-transitory business with human
means."9 5 The Court did not inquire into the extent of the business
carried out in Ontario, the number of employees in the province, the
volume of sales or purchases in the province, or any other indicators of
carrying on business.
Furthermore, it failed to consider facts that tended to weigh
against the conclusion that Chevron Canada was carrying on business
L.Q. 645, 646 (1988) ("The position in cases where the defendant is a company is much
less straightforward. A company is an artificial entity and, as such, cannot literally be
present or resident in the forum.").
95. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 86.
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in Ontario. For instance, it did not consider that only three (out of
seven hundred) Chevron Canada employees worked at the physical
office in Ontario. This represents a mere 0.004 percent of the Chevron
Canada workforce. The Court also glossed over the fact that it was only
a division of Chevron Canada (its lubricant division) that was located
in Ontario.9 6 And the Court did not consider the extent of business that
Chevron Canada carried out in Ontario: What were its sales in
Ontario? What percentage of its total revenue did these sales comprise?
Did the Chevron Canada employees work exclusively in Ontario, or did
they travel to other provinces? None of these questions were addressed.
In short, the Court affirmed the finding that Chevron Canada was
carrying on business based on very limited facts. Those facts that it did
use to support the conclusion that there was presence-based
jurisdiction over Chevron Canada suggest that the hurdle for finding
that a corporation is carrying on business is extremely low.97
Further complicating the inquiry is the fact that the Court cited
case law that implies that a physical place of business is not necessarily
required to find that a corporation is carrying on business. The Court
cited the Alberta Court of Appeal's decision in Wilson v. Hull" for the
proposition that carrying on business requires "some direct or indirect
presence in the state asserting jurisdiction, accompanied by a degree
of business activity which is sustained for a period of time."9 9 The Court
further stated that "the common law has consistently found the
maintenance of physical business premises to be a compelling
jurisdictional factor [in determining whether a corporation is carrying
on business]." 00 Finally, the Court pointed to Van Breda's guidance
that "carrying on business requires some form of actual, not only
virtual, presence in the jurisdiction, such as maintaining an office
there."1or
All of these references suggest that it may not be necessary for a
corporation to have a physical place of business in a province in order
96. Chevron Canada's website is completely distinct from Chevron Lubricants'
website. Compare CHEVRON CANADA, http://www.chevron.cal (last visited Feb. 2, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/6574-SD95] (archived Fed. 2, 2017) with CHEVRON LUBRICANTS,
http://canada.chevronlubricants.com/ (last visited Feb. 2, 2017) [https://perma.cclG4TT-
LV7K] (archived Feb. 2, 2017).
97. See, e.g., Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd. v. IFS Vehicle Distrib. ULC, 2016 ONSC
2980 (Can.), aff'd, 2016 ONCA 977 (Can.) (finding that the defendant was carrying on
business in Ontario, for the purpose of the Van Breda presumptive connecting factor,
based on a very limited business presence in Ontario). The Ontario Court of Appeal in
Stuart Budd suggested that Chevron was actually an example of a case where the
defendant had a "more substantial presence" in Ontario than the defendant in Stuart
Budd itself. This can be read to support the proposition that a business presence even
less compelling than that in Chevron can suffice to establish presence-based jurisdiction.
98. Wilson, 174 A.R. at para. 52.
99. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 85 (emphasis added) (quoting Wilson, 174 A.R. at
para. 52).
100. Id.
101. Id. (quoting Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at para. 87).
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to subject it to presence-based jurisdiction. The reference, for instance,
to "indirect presence" implies that a corporation could be found to be
carrying on business in a jurisdiction where it does not have a physical
place of business. Similarly, the reference to physical premises being a
"compelling jurisdictional factor"-rather than a necessary
jurisdictional factor-also suggests that a physical place of business
may not be required to assert presence-based jurisdiction over a
corporation. Finally, the quote from Van Breda provides that carrying
on business requires some sort of actual presence in a province, such
as maintaining an office there. It is clear from this statement that
maintaining an office is an example of a situation that denotes actual
presence, but maintaining an office is not necessarily required to
ground presence-based jurisdiction.
It seems, then, that presence-based jurisdiction could conceivably
be asserted over a corporation by virtue of service of process on one of
its employees while he is physically present in the province (but not
physically present at a place of business). For instance, in Chevron
itself, there were only three employees located at the Chevron Canada
office in Ontario.1 02 The other ten employees worked in Ontario out of
their homes. 0 3 If one of the ten employees had been served at home, it
could have conceivably still grounded jurisdiction over Chevron
Canada under the Supreme Court of Canada's theory of presence-
based jurisdiction.
An issue that the Supreme Court of Canada did not address was
the timing of when a corporation is carrying on business for the
purpose of the jurisdictional test. In Chevron, Chevron Canada's
business presence in Ontario was established the same month that the
enforcement action was filed.104 It would stand to reason that at the
time the enforcement action was filed in Ontario, Chevron Canada's
business activities in Ontario were not "sustained for a period of
time."1 05 This raises the question of what the reference point is for
whether the defendant is carrying on business. Is a court to look at the
defendant's business activities at the time the lawsuit is filed? Or,
should a court confine itself to examining a defendant's business
activities at the time the underlying conduct that forms the basis of the
lawsuit took place? If a case is appealed, as in Chevron itself, can a
court consider the business activities of the defendant that took place
between the initial lawsuit and the appeal? Clearly, the Court
considered Chevron Canada's business activities in Ontario that post-
dated the lawsuit (since Chevron Canada had just barely established a
commercial presence in Ontario at the time the lawsuit was filed).
102. Factum of the Appellant Chevron Can. Ltd., supra note 8, at para. 12.
103. Id. at para. 40.
104. Id. at para. 12.
105. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 85 (quoting Wilson, 174 A.R. at para. 52).
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Considering business activities that post-date the lawsuit as
grounds for jurisdiction over the lawsuit seems nonsensical. How can
a court that lacks jurisdiction at the beginning of the lawsuit somehow
acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the passage of time (and the
concomitant increase in business activity that takes place over time)?
Either a court has jurisdiction over the lawsuit at the time the action
is commenced, or it does not. A plaintiff should not be able to obtain
jurisdiction over a defendant simply by having time go by and letting
the corporate defendant's connection with a given province become
more established.
Overall, it is clear that the Court in Chevron endorsed a very low
standard for carrying on business. It even intimated that a physical
place of business might not be required in order to find that a company
is carrying on business in a province. If this is the case, then plaintiffs
would be wise to serve a corporation in juris if there is any business
being done in a province. And, if a court accepts the argument that the
corporation is carrying on business (under the low standard adopted in
Chevron), then jurisdiction over any and all claims is automatically
established.
2. Chevron Results in Universal Jurisdiction over Corporations
Interpreting presence-based jurisdiction over corporations in the
way that the Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron did may result in
universal assertions of jurisdiction over corporations that are carrying
on business in a province. As discussed, the threshold for carrying on
business is low: the corporation need only conduct some regular
business in the province and be physically served there. As the result
in Chevron itself shows, even if a corporation only has a few employees
in the province, this will suffice for the purposes of presence-based
jurisdiction. Once a corporation is served with process in the province,
the corporation is subject to jurisdiction for any and all claims
involving the corporation. This is the crux of the problem with
presence-based jurisdiction for corporations: it results in universal
jurisdiction over corporations. What is it about the act of service in a
province where the corporation is carrying on business that entitles the
plaintiff to have any matter adjudicated in the province, including (and
especially) those that are wholly unconnected with the province? What
is the conceptual justification for universal jurisdiction over
corporations based purely on service of process in a province where it
carries on business? The Court does not answer these difficult
questions. 0 6
106. The closest thing to a justification for presence-based jurisdiction is found at
paragraph 89:
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Interestingly, however, the Court does appear concerned about
universal jurisdiction, albeit in the context of assumed jurisdiction. In
discussing the presumptive connecting factor of "carrying on business"
in Van Breda, the Court stated the following:
Carrying on business in the jurisdiction may also be considered an appropriate
connecting factor. But considering it to be one may raise more difficult issues.
Resolving those issues may require some caution in order to avoid creating what
would amount to forms of universal jurisdiction in respect of tort claims arising
out of certain categories of business or commercial activity.107
Ironically, the Court in Chevron appeared oblivious to the very
concern (universal jurisdiction) that had troubled it just a few years
earlier in Van Breda. The Court in Van Breda was careful to point out
that the "carrying on business" presumptive connecting factor could be
rebutted by showing that the business carried on in the province had
little or nothing to do with the underlying cause of action. 108 In
Chevron, however, there is no ability to defeat jurisdiction by arguing
that the business carried on is unrelated to the cause of action.10 9
Instead, once service of process is validly effected on a corporation
carrying on business in the province, the plaintiff has met the burden
of establishing jurisdiction simpliciter.
The difference in result can be explained simply: service in juris
entitles a court to assume jurisdiction over any matter involving the
defendant, while service exjuris entitles a court to assume jurisdiction
over matters that are sufficiently connected with the province. But this
still does not answer the question of why. Why does service in juris on
a corporation carrying on business in a province result in automatic
jurisdiction over the defendant? 1 o The Court alludes to history and
Chevron Canada has elected to establish and continue to operate a place of
business in Mississauga, Ontario, at which it was served. It should therefore
have expected that it might one day be called upon to answer to an Ontario
court's request that it defend against an action. If a defendant maintains a place
of business in Ontario, it is reasonable to say that the Ontario courts have an
interest in the defendant and the disputes in which it becomes involved.
Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 89. The Court does not explain, however, why Chevron's
business activities in Ontario would give rise to the expectation that it could be sued in
Ontario in respect of claims that have nothing to do with its business. In other words,
the Court does not explain why presence-based jurisdiction should confer general
jurisdiction over a corporation.
107. Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at para. 87.
108. Id. at para. 96.
109. At least with respect to jurisdiction simpliciter. A defendant may still be able
to argue that the case should be stayed or dismissed on the basis of forum non conveniens.
110. This same argument was accepted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daimler.
There, Justice Ginsberg stated that "[n]othing in International Shoe and its progeny
suggests that 'a particular quantum of local activity' should give a State authority over
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tradition, but, as discussed above, the Court provides very little
support for this proposition. So what is left is an unsettling variant of
"just because" in order to answer the question of why service in juris
on a corporation carrying on business in a province confers general
jurisdiction.
One might argue that this emphasis on universal or exorbitant
jurisdiction is overstated. That is, just because a court can hear a case
does not necessarily mean that a court will hear a case. A corporation
that is subject to presence-based jurisdiction could still argue under
the doctrine of forum non conveniens that there is a more appropriate
forum somewhere else. Accordingly, the fear that a corporation might
be subject to all-purpose jurisdiction is not as acute as it might
otherwise appear. Whether a court uses forum non conveniens to
remedy any perceived unfair assertions of jurisdiction depends,
however, on how a court views presence-based jurisdiction over
corporations. The Supreme Court of Canada repeatedly emphasized
that presence is a "traditional" basis of jurisdiction, noting that its
historical roots "cannot be over-emphasized." 11 It contrasted presence-
based jurisdiction with assumed jurisdiction: "[a]ssumed jurisdiction,
for its part, emerged much later and developed through the adoption
of rules for service ex juris . . . . When a court finds that it has
jurisdiction on this basis, that jurisdiction is limited to the specific
action at issue before it."1 12 In drawing the distinction between
"traditional" presence-based jurisdiction and the "much later"
developed assumed jurisdiction, the Court implied that the former was
a more compelling form of jurisdiction-hence the reason that it
entitled a court to assume jurisdiction over any cause of action before
it. It would seem strange, then, for courts to employ the doctrine of
forum non conveniens to displace jurisdiction in a forum that has
general jurisdiction over a corporation. In other words, presumably
those situations that the law regards as sufficient to confer general
jurisdiction (such as presence and domicile1 13 ) should be those
situations where a court does not stay an action on the basis of forum
non conveniens.
Ultimately, the Chevron decision opens up jurisdiction in a way
that few had contemplated. Corporations carrying on any sort of
business activity in Canada should be wary that they will be subject to
general jurisdiction in provincial courts. Unfortunately, there is little
explanation for this form of universal jurisdiction beyond the Court's
reference to history and tradition.
a 'far larger quantum of . . . activity' having no connection to any in-state activity."
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014).
111. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 83.
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. The Court in Van Breda muddied the waters with respect to domicile,
making it only a presumptive connecting factor-but then saying that the presumption
would rarely, if ever, be displaced. See Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at para. 87.
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B. Chevron Obviates the Need for Resorting to the Real and
Substantial Connection Test in Many Cases
The Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron was careful to
distinguish between presence-based jurisdiction predicated on service
in juris and assumed jurisdiction predicated on service ex juris. What
it failed to recognize, however, is that its holding that corporations are
subject to jurisdiction if they are served in a province where they are
carrying on business means that resorting to assumed jurisdiction (the
real and substantial connection test) will now be unnecessary in many
cases. As long as the defendant carries on business in the province and
there is some place where it can be served with process, 114 this will
likely meet the standard that the Court set out in Chevron.
Consider, for instance, the facts of Charron, one of the two Van
Breda companion cases. In Charron, the defendant, Club Resorts, was
held to have been 'carrying on business' in Ontario under the
presumptive connecting factors approach to jurisdiction. The Court
stated that
Club Resorts' commercial activities in Ontario went well beyond promoting a
brand and advertising. Its representatives were in the province on a regular
basis. It benefited from the physical presence of an office in Ontario. Most
significantly, on cross-examination Club Resorts' witness admitted that it was in
the business of carrying out activities in Canada. Together, these facts support
the conclusion that Club Resorts was carrying on business in Ontario.115
In Charron, the defendant was served ex juris, hence the Court's
application of the real and substantial connection test. 116 However, if
the defendant had been served in Ontario at the office referenced by
the Court, this likely would have sufficed to meet the Chevron standard
for presence-based jurisdiction. 117 Ironically the Chevron Court's
holding on presence-based jurisdiction would mean that the leading
case on assumed jurisdiction should not have been a case on assumed
jurisdiction at all. The plaintiffs in Charron should simply have served
Club Resorts at the office it was using in Ontario and then relied on
"traditional" 18 presence-based jurisdiction.
114. It may be that a physical location is not even required. See infra Section
W.A. 1.
115. Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at para. 122.
116. Id. at paras. 113-14.
117. The only caveat is that the office that Club Resorts carried out business from
was not its own, but rather that of SuperClubs, a group with whom Club Resorts was
associated. Id. at para. 5.
118. The Supreme Court referred to presence-based jurisdiction as a "traditional"
ground of jurisdiction well over a dozen times in the judgment. See e.g., id. at paras. 36,
47, 55, 77-79.
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It would appear that any case that would qualify under Van Breda
as carrying on business would also qualify under Chevron as carrying
on business. So, why would a plaintiff ever choose to serve a defendant
corporation ex juris, rather than serving the corporation in juris? In
the former situation, the plaintiff would need to establish that the
corporation's business is connected to the underlying cause of action.
In the latter case, however, the act of service in the province
automatically confers jurisdiction simpliciter. There is no ability for the
defendant to contest jurisdiction on the basis of a lack of connection
between the cause of action and the province.11 9
From a perusal of the case law post-Chevron, it does not appear
that litigants have picked up on this easy way of establishing personal
jurisdiction.1 20 For instance, in Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd. v. IFS Vehicle
Distribs. ULC, 121 which was decided eight months after the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Chevron, the plaintiff argued (and the
Court accepted) that jurisdiction was appropriate because the
defendant corporation was carrying on business in Ontario.1 22 In that
case, the defendant corporation had been served ex juris, and,
consequently, the Court examined the application of the real and
119. Wilson v. Riu, 2012 ONSC 6840 illustrates this disconnect between carrying
on business as a presumptive connecting factor and carrying on business as a basis for
presence-based jurisdiction. In Wilson, the plaintiffs sued the defendant, Thomas Cook,
for injuries sustained as part of an excursion during a vacation to Jamaica. The court
applied Van Breda and concluded that Thomas Cook was carrying on business in
Ontario. However, the court found that Thomas Cook rebutted the presumption of
jurisdiction that arises from the application of this presumptive factor:
However, I am satisfied on the evidence that they have discharged the onus on
them to rebut the presumption. Thomas Cook packaged the air and ground
transportation as well as the hotel accommodation for the male Plaintiffs trip,
but had nothing to do with the booking of the horseback riding excursion. To
require a tour packager like Thomas Cook to have to respond to claims in Ontario
when some type of misfortune is experienced in a foreign jurisdiction by a patron,
by reason only of having sent him or her there as part of a travel package, would
open the Ontario court to universal assumption of jurisdiction.
Id. at para. 13. Accordingly, the court did not assert jurisdiction over Thomas Cook.
However, if the plaintiffs had served Thomas Cook in Ontario, they would have
automatically established presence-based jurisdiction. The fact that the plaintiffs (or,
more accurately, their attorney) chose not to serve Thomas Cook in juris is further
evidence that presence-based jurisdiction over corporations was not a well-entrenched
jurisdictional principle prior to Chevron.
120. Or, it could be that service of process in these cases pre-dated the Court's
pronouncement in Chevron. In either event, however, the fact that sophisticated parties
represented by competent law firms are unaware that jurisdiction over corporations can
be established simply by serving a corporation in juris casts doubt on the Supreme
Court's judgment in Chevron and its repeated indications that the practice is
longstanding and well-established.
121. 2015 ONSC 519 (Can.), affd, 2016 ONCA 977 (Can.).
122. Id. at para. 38.
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substantial connection test.123 The Court documented in detail the
reasons why it concluded that the defendant carried on business in
Ontario. 124 It also indicated that there was a physical address in
Ontario from which the defendant carried on business. 125 The
defendant in Stuart Budd did not rebut the presumption of jurisdiction
that arose from the plaintiff satisfying the "carrying on business"
presumptive connecting factor. What does not make sense about the
Stuart Budd decision is why, if the defendant was carrying on business
in Ontario, the plaintiff did not serve the defendant in Ontario. Then
the Van Breda framework could have been avoided in its entirety, and
the plaintiff would simply have established presence-based jurisdiction
under Chevron. The fact that counsel chose not to serve process in juris
is revealing. It shows that jurisdiction based on the presence of a
corporation in a province when served with process is decidedly not an
established or traditional feature of the Canadian jurisdictional
landscape. It could be that, as lawyers begin to appreciate the
implications of the Court's decision in Chevron, many more cases will
be disposed of on the basis of presence-based jurisdiction and that the
real battle will be fought in forum non conveniens motions.
C. Presence-Based Jurisdiction in Chevron Is Conceptually
Misaligned with Van Breda
At a macro level, the Supreme Court of Canada's endorsement of
presence-based jurisdiction over corporations is inconsistent with its
restrictive approach to assumed jurisdiction in Van Breda. Part of the
purpose behind the Van Breda framework was to restrict jurisdictional
assertions that had become exorbitant.1 26 Under the approach that
prevailed in Muscutt v. Courcelles,127 courts could (and would) assume
jurisdiction over cases that had a very tenuous connection to the
province. The Court in Van Breda sought to remedy this concern by
providing guidance on the categories of cases where a defendant would
be subject to jurisdiction. Van Breda, in other words, was intended to
narrow the assertion of personal jurisdiction over defendants. The rule
articulated in Chevron, however, dramatically expands personal
jurisdiction doctrine. Thus, there is a tension between the restrictive
Van Breda approach to ex juris service and the expansive Chevron
approach to in juris service.
At a micro level, interpreting presence-based jurisdiction over a
corporation in the way the Court did in Chevron creates a conceptual
123. Id. at para. 35.
124. Id. at paras. 36-51.
125. Id. at para. 48.
126. Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at paras. 23, 66.
127. Muscutt, 60 O.R. 3d. 20.
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misalignment with the Court's approach to assumed jurisdiction in
Van Breda. In Van Breda, the Court laid out a framework for
approaching the real and substantial connection test, as a conflict of
laws rule, in the context of tort claims.1 28 It endorsed a presumptive
connecting factors approach, whereby jurisdiction would be presumed
in cases fitting within the Court's four presumptive connecting
factors. 129 The Court also left open the possibility that additional
presumptive connecting factors could be added to the list, as the
necessity arose.1 30 The Court determined that, in tort cases, the
following presumptive connecting factors would prima facie permit a
court to assume jurisdiction over a dispute:
(a) the defendant is domiciled or resident in the province;
(b) the defendant carries on business in the province;
(c) the tort was committed in the province; and
(d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province.131
Two of these factors (domicile/residence and carrying on business)
do not fit well with the view of presence-based jurisdiction over
corporations that the Court endorsed in Chevron. Each will be
discussed in turn.
1. Domicile/Residence as a Basis for Jurisdiction
First, the Supreme Court of Canada in Van Breda determined that
domicile or residence in the province was a presumptive connecting
factor that would prima facie entitle a court to assume jurisdiction.' 3 2
The Court suggested that all of the factors were rebuttable, which
would necessarily include the domicile/residence ground for
jurisdiction. It stated that
[t]he presumption with respect to a factor will not be irrebuttable .... The
defendant might argue that a given connection is inappropriate in the
circumstances of the case. In such a case, the defendant will bear the burden of
negating the presumptive effect of the listed or new factor and convincing the
court that the proposed assumption of jurisdiction would be inappropriate. If no
presumptive connecting factor, either listed or new, applies in the circumstances
of a case or if the presumption of jurisdiction resulting from such a factor is
128. See Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at paras. 73, 90-91.
129. For a critique of the Supreme Court of Canada's judgment in Van Breda, see
Monestier, supra note 58.
130. Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at para. 91.
131. Id. at para. 90.
132. See id. at paras. 86, 90.
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properly rebutted, the court will lack jurisdiction on the basis of the common law
real and substantial connection test.133
However, the Court went on to say that "a defendant may always
be sued in a court of the jurisdiction in which he or she is domiciled or
resident (in the case of a legal person, the location of its head office)."1 34
The fact that domicile/residence is on the list of rebuttable presumptive
factors, but that the Court states that a defendant may "always" be
sued where he or she is domiciled or resident, creates some confusion.
Consequently, it is unclear whether domicile is a rebuttable or an
irrebuttable basis for jurisdiction.
One might think that, if the domicile/residence ground for
jurisdiction were irrebuttable, it would not be included on a
"presumptive" and "rebuttable" connecting factors list. For argument's
sake, it is assumed that the Supreme Court of Canada contemplated
that the domicile/residence ground for jurisdiction could be rebutted. If
that is true, then, in some circumstances, a court would not have
jurisdiction simpliciter over a corporate defendant even though that
corporate defendant is domiciled or resident in the forum.
In Chevron, the Court stated that a corporation that is carrying
on business in the forum is automatically subject to personal
jurisdiction (under a presence theory) if it is served with process in the
forum. 35 Thus, any corporation that is carrying on business within the
meaning of Chevron and is served with process in juris is subject to
personal jurisdiction and answerable for any type of claim arising
anywhere in the world. It is odd that a corporation that is domiciled in
the forum (and thus has a very significant connection to the forum)
may not be subject to jurisdiction because of the rebuttable
presumption in Van Breda, but that a corporation that is simply
carrying on business and is served with process in juris (and thus may
not have a particularly significant connection with the forum) is
automatically subject to jurisdiction on a presence-based theory under
Chevron. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Canada's treatment of
domicile/residence (in Van Breda) and presence (in Chevron) is an
incongruous fit.
2. Carrying on Business Under the Van Breda Framework
In Van Breda, the Supreme Court of Canada indicated that
'carrying on business' in the province was a presumptive connecting
factor in tort cases.' 3 6 First, it is not clear whether carrying-on business
133. Id. at para. 81.
134. Id. at para. 86.
135. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 94.
136. Van Breda, 1 S.C.R. at para. 87.
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for the purposes of Van Breda is the same as, or different from, carrying
on business for the purpose of service in juris. One would assume that
they are the same (or at least very similar) tests, if for no other reason
than they bear the same moniker.13 7
Assume that a U.S. pharmaceutical company that operates
primarily in the United States sets up a small three-person office in
Ontario to distribute pharmaceutical products in Canada. Assume
further that a resident of New York was prescribed a drug
manufactured by the pharmaceutical company in New York and
suffered personal injury in New York. Instead of suing in New York,
the plaintiff decides to sue in Ontario. Is this permissible? Under
presence-based jurisdiction (Chevron), the answer is yes; under the
presumptive connecting factors framework (Van Breda), the answer is
no.
With respect to presence-based jurisdiction, if a company has a
physical location in Ontario, is carrying on business there, and is
served with process there, then Ontario has presence-based
jurisdiction according to Chevron.'3 8 Thus, the key would be to serve
the U.S. pharmaceutical company at its business location in Ontario.
If the U.S. pharmaceutical company were served ex juris at its
principal place of business in the United States, on the other hand,
then jurisdiction would not be automatic. Rather, the plaintiff would
need to fit himself within one of the presumptive connecting factors
(carrying on business) and the defendant pharmaceutical company
would have the ability to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction. Given
that the cause of action arose in New York and had nothing to do with
Ontario, the defendant pharmaceutical company would easily be able
to rebut this presumptive connecting factor. Again, it is strange that
the results could be so variable depending on whether a corporation is
served in juris or ex juris. Chevron Canada made this same point in its
factum:
[A] corporation with its head office out of Ontario and a place of business in
Ontario could be served in Ontario (under Rule 16.02(1)(c) or (e)) or served ex
juris on the basis that it carries on business within Ontario (under Rule
17.02(p)). To conclude that different jurisdictional analyses should follow would
be illogical and unprincipled-and thus contrary to the principles of order and
fairness that underlie the rules of private international law-as it could lead to
137. In Stuart Budd & Sons Ltd. v. IFS Vehicle Distrib. ULC, 2016 ONSC 60
(Can.), aff'd, 2016 ONCA 977 (Can.) at paras. 7-17, the Ontario Court of Appeal seemed
to suggest that the determination of "carrying on business" is the same for both the
purposes of presence-based jurisdiction (Chevron) or assumed jurisdiction (Van Breda).
In Stuart Budd, the Court cited Chevron's holding on carrying on business (presence-
based jurisdiction) to support its conclusion that the defendant was carrying on business
under the Van Breda framework.
138. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 94.
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differing jurisprudential results on the same facts based only on which of the two
methods of service was used.139
Thus, a plaintiff would fare better by serving a corporation that is
arguably carrying on business in Ontario at its place of business in
Ontario.1 40 If a court agrees that the corporation is indeed carrying on
business in Ontario, then the Ontario court has jurisdiction over any
and all claims against that corporation. Given that jurisdiction would
be based on presence (rather than the real and substantial connection
test), the defendant would not have the ability to argue that the
business carried on is unrelated to the underlying cause of action. If
the plaintiff had instead served the defendant corporation ex juris, the
defendant would retain the ability to argue that, while it may have
been carrying on business in Ontario, that business was not related to
the underlying cause of action and, accordingly, an Ontario court
should not assume jurisdiction. The very same factual predicate
(carrying on business) would lead to different jurisdictional
consequences, depending on the technicalities of service. Such a result
encourages gamesmanship and raises questions about the fairness of
the current framework for the assertion of jurisdiction.
V. THE U.S. APPROACH TO PRESENCE-BASED JURISDICTION AND
CORPORATIONS
To understand how much of an outlier the Canadian approach is,
it is helpful to examine how courts in the United States have dealt with
the issue of corporations and presence-based jurisdiction. At the outset,
it is important to note that U.S. courts do not recognize the validity of
the pure presence-based form of jurisdiction for corporations that the
Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron has appeared to embrace. 14 1 In
139. Factum of the Appellant Chevron Can. Ltd., supra note 8, at para. 50.
140. The same analysis is true under the Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings
Transfer Act ("CJPTA"). Section 10 of the CJPTA provides that there is a presumption
of jurisdiction that arises when a corporation is "carrying on business" in the province.
Provincial rules of civil procedure, in turn, authorize service out of the jurisdiction on
the basis that the corporation is carrying on business in the province. However, the
CJPTA also provides for jurisdiction over a corporation if the corporation is "ordinarily
resident" in the province. This is defined for a corporation to include, inter alia, that the
corporation is carrying on business in the province. Accordingly, there is no need to resort
to service out rules where the corporation is carrying on business in the province. It is
far more effective for a plaintiff to simply serve the defendant corporation in juris,
thereby subjecting that corporation to automatic presence-based jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Court Jurisdiction and Proceedings Transfer Act, UNIFORM LAW CONFERENCE OF
CANADA, http://www.ulcc.ca/en/home/183-josetta-1-en-gb/uniform-actsa/court-jurisdiction-
and-proceedings-transfer-act/1092-court-jurisdiction-proceedings-transfer-act (last visited
Feb. 7, 2017) [https://perma.cc/6VEZ-VPJ6] (archived Feb. 7, 2017).
141. See, e.g., Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2310 (2015):
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other words, there is no tag jurisdiction over corporations in the United
States. A corporation cannot be subject to jurisdiction in a state simply
because it carries on business in a state and is served with process at
its place of business in that state. 142
We must decide whether, under Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 110
S.Ct. 2105, 109 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990), service of process on a corporation's officer
within the forum state creates general personal jurisdiction over the corporation.
We hold that Burnham does not apply to corporations. A court may exercise
general personal jurisdiction over a corporation only when its contacts "render it
essentially at home" in the state.
142. With that said, there is a form of jurisdiction in the United States that seems
to resemble tag jurisdiction-though it is premised on consent, and not presence. Every
state has a registration statute that requires a corporation that is doing business in the
state to register with the state and appoint an agent for service of process. If a
corporation does business in the state without registering pursuant to the appropriate
state statute, then the corporation risks fines and other penalties. Some states have
interpreted their registration statutes as conferring general jurisdiction over a
corporation that has registered pursuant to the state statute. The theory relied upon by
these states is that by registering to do business in a state, the corporation has
voluntarily subjected itself to the state's all-purpose jurisdiction. Stated differently, by
virtue of registering under a state statute, a corporation has consented to give a state
jurisdiction over the corporation in respect of any and all causes of action. This form of
jurisdiction is currently being challenged in the courts and by commentators as being
unconstitutional. For commentators, see Kevin Benish, Pennoyer's Ghost: Consent,
Registration Statutes, and General Jurisdiction after Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1609 (2015) (evaluating general personal jurisdiction based on a "consent-by-
registration" theory and arguing that this old basis of jurisdiction is unconstitutional
after Daimler AG v. Bauman); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General
Jurisdiction, and the Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1380 (2015) (arguing
that registration amounts to coerced consent and accordingly is not a legitimate basis of
jurisdiction); Matthew Kipp, Inferring Express Consent: The Paradox of Permitting
Registration Statutes to Confer General Jurisdiction, 9 REV. LITIG. 1, 4 (1990) (arguing
that the Supreme Court's broadened analysis after International Shoe makes it no longer
permissible to view registration as a sufficient basis for exercising jurisdiction over a
cause of action arising outside the state; consequently, when the Court expanded its
approach by including an examination of the relationship between the litigation and the
forum, the use of registration statutes to confer jurisdiction over a defendant for a cause
of action arising outside the state became obsolete); D. Craig Lewis, Jurisdiction Over
Foreign Corporations Based on Registration and Appointment of an Agent: An
Unconstitutional Condition Perpetuated, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 3 (1990) (arguing that
treating a corporation's appointment of an agent for service or process as a basis for
general jurisdiction imposes an unconstitutional condition on a foreign corporation's
ability to transact business in the state); Lee Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes,
Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1163
(2003) (arguing that while the Due Process Clause does not prohibit the assertion of
general jurisdiction based on registration, the unpredictability that registration statutes
produce "invalidates the consent theory upon which ... personal jurisdiction is
premised"). For cases, see Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 641 (2d Cir.
2016) ("[I]n the absence of a clear legislative statement and a definitive interpretation
by the Connecticut Supreme Court and in light of constitutional concerns, we construe
Connecticut's registration statute and appointment of agent provisions not to require
registrant corporations that have appointed agents for service of process to submit to the
general jurisdiction of Connecticut courts."); Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123,
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For many years, however, U.S. courts recognized the validity of
"doing business" jurisdiction.1 43 That is, if a corporation engaged in a
significant amount of business in a forum-and thereby had
continuous and systematic general business contacts with that
forum-then the corporation would be subject to general jurisdiction
there.144 As discussed, general jurisdiction enables a court to take
jurisdiction over any and all claims against a defendant, even if the
claim is unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the forum.1 45 For
instance, if ABC Corporation was doing business in New York, then a
court would be able to assume jurisdiction over ABC Corporation even
if the cause of action arose in Connecticut and had absolutely nothing
to do with New York. The theory was that if a corporation maintained
strong ties with a forum, such that it was availing itself of the privilege
of conducting business there, then it was fair and reasonable to subject
that corporation to personal jurisdiction in the forum with respect to
any and all causes of action. Otherwise stated, because the corporation
maintained a strong commercial presence in the forum, it would be
subject to general jurisdiction there.
127 (Del. 2016) (explaining that corporate registration statute governing service of
process on foreign corporations requires a foreign corporation to allow service of process
to be made upon it in a convenient way in proper cases, but statute is not a consent to
general jurisdiction). It is important to emphasize, however, that general jurisdiction
based on registration (to the extent that it is constitutional) is a form of consent-based
jurisdiction, not presence-based jurisdiction. Accordingly, it is not quite comparable to
the form of tag jurisdiction articulated in Chevron. In Chevron, it is the combination of
the defendant corporation's presence in the province, along with service of process, that
grounds jurisdiction. With registration, it is the consensual act of registration, combined
with service of process, that grounds jurisdiction.
143. Genuine Parts Co., 137 A.3d at 129-30 ("Until recently, a foreign corporation
could be subject to general jurisdiction if it had 'continuous and systematic' business
contacts in the forum state. That is, merely doing business in a state was a basis for
general jurisdiction there.").
144. The idea of continuous and systematic contacts grounding general
jurisdiction was referenced in the leading case on specific jurisdiction, International
Shoe. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) ("[T]here have been
instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.").
145. General jurisdiction is sometimes referred to as "all-purpose" jurisdiction or
"dispute-blind." See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 749 (referring to general jurisdiction as
"all-purpose" jurisdiction); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1121 n.6 (2014) (same);
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (same);
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 897 (2011) (same); Dickson Marine
Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 339 (5th Cir. 1999) (referring to general jurisdiction
as dispute blind); Tom's of Me. v. Acme-Hardesty Co., 565 F. Supp. 2d 171, 175 (D. Me.
2008) (same); PPD Ship, L.L.C. v. Enos, No. Civ.A.03-0976, 2003 WL 22038517, at *4
(E.D. La. Aug. 28, 2003) (same).
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For decades, courts in the United States accepted the legitimacy
of doing business jurisdiction,1 46 but all of that changed with the U.S.
Supreme Court's landmark decision in Daimler v. Bauman.147 In
Daimler, the Court held that a corporation is only subject to general
jurisdiction if the corporation has continuous and systematic general
business contacts with a forum, such that it can fairly be regarded as
"at home" there.148 Justice Ginsburg, writing for eight members of the
146. See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984); Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). Note that
commentators had long questioned the legitimacy of doing business jurisdiction. For
example, Professor Erichson starts off an article with the following statement:
What, if anything, gives a state sufficiently plenary power over a person that the
state may adjudicate claims against the person even if the claims arose
elsewhere? Particularly with regard to corporations, this basic question has
lacked a clear answer. The standard for general jurisdiction remains
unsatisfactorily vague, with ambiguous Supreme Court guidance on doctrine and
even less explanation of why such jurisdiction exists.
Howard M. Erichson, The Home-State Test for General Personal Jurisdiction, 66 VAND.
L. REV. EN BANC 81, 81-82 (2013) (emphasis in original).
147. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746.
148. Note that the "at home" language had been introduced into the jurisdictional
discourse a couple of years earlier in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). In Goodyear, North Carolina plaintiffs sued tire manufacturer
Goodyear USA and several of its foreign subsidiaries in North Carolina, stemming from
an accident that took place in France. Goodyear's subsidiaries, based in Turkey, France,
and Luxembourg, challenged the jurisdiction of the North Carolina court. Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the plurality, concluded that the defendants' "attenuated
connections to the State [fell] far short of the 'the continuous and systematic general
business contacts' necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them
on claims unrelated to anything that connects them to the State." Id. at 929. She noted
that the paradigm bases for general jurisdiction over a corporation are its state of
incorporation and the state of its principal place of business. Id. at 923-24. In addition,
she stated that a court could assert general jurisdiction over a corporation where the
corporation's affiliations with a state were "so 'continuous and systematic' as to render
them essentially at home in the forum State." Id. at 916. On the facts of Goodyear, Justice
Ginsburg readily concluded that the foreign defendants were "in no sense at home in
North Carolina." Following Goodyear, there was some confusion over the meaning of the
Court's new "at home" language. See, e.g., Meir Feder, Goodyear, "Home," and the
Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 677 (2012) ("The
Court did not specify what it meant by at home, or address how many states could qualify
with respect to a particular corporation-a question that is sure to be litigated in future
cases. However, the Goodyear opinion did include several clues suggesting that the Court
may have intended the at home standard as a narrow one, perhaps extending no further
than a corporation's state of incorporation and principal place of business."); Todd David
Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 202, 214-15, 217 (2011) ("Thus, Justice Ginsburg suggests that, under
the specific facts of Goodyear, the plaintiffs theory of personal jurisdiction reaches far
beyond existing precedent, but she does not explicitly suggest that she intends to go
further than this case requires and reverse the multitude of lower court cases that rest
general jurisdiction on direct sales to the forum state. That result would be vastly more
far reaching than what the decision in Goodyear requires and would work a major change
in lower court caselaw without consideration of the very different facts of those cases.").
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Court, made it clear that a corporation is ordinarily only at home in
two places: its state of incorporation and the state of its principal place
of business. It would be a rare case where a corporation is at home
anywhere else. The Court in Daimler outright rejected the idea that
significant corporate presence in a forum (short of being at home there)
could suffice to ground general jurisdiction over a corporation. Daimler
represented a paradigm shift in the law of general jurisdiction,
overturning over fifty years of precedent. 149
It is important, however, to distinguish doing business jurisdiction
that existed prior to Daimler from the presence-based jurisdiction that
the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized in Chevron. In Chevron,
the Court indicated that, as long a corporation is carrying on business
in the province and can physically be served there, it is subject to
general jurisdiction in the province. As the law existed prior to
Daimler, on the other hand, U.S. courts required that a corporation
have continuous and systematic general business contacts with the
forum in order to ground general jurisdiction. In-state service was also
not a prerequisite to asserting jurisdiction under the theory of doing
business jurisdiction.
The critical difference between the two is that the threshold of
connection between the forum and the corporate defendant is much
lower under the Canadian test than it ever was in the United States.
While the tests may sound alike (carrying on business and doing
business), they are not the same. Carrying on business requires a fairly
minimal degree of connection with the forum. As the Chevron case
itself demonstrates, a physical office in Ontario, along with a handful
of employees working there, suffices to meet the standard of carrying
on business. By contrast, doing business in the United States was a
fairly high standard, even before Daimler, requiring a showing that the
corporation engaged in continuous and systematic business activities
in the forum.1 50 If a corporation had a physical office in a state, and a
149. See generally Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye
Significant Contacts: General Personal Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76
OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 105-06 (2015) ("Daimler is a game changer. In advancing the policy
goal of giving corporations the power to limit states where they must answer legal claims,
the Court shrinks the places of general jurisdiction against many large corporations to
one or two states."); Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is Home Depot 'At Home'?: Daimler v.
Bauman and the End of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J. 233, 265 (2014)
("The message in Daimler has come through loud and clear: doing business jurisdiction
is a dead letter."); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward A
New Equilibrium in Personal Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIs L. REV. 207, 228 (2014)
("Bauman is likely to be the more disruptive case, however.... Bauman now gives such
corporations a ground to contest jurisdiction outside of their home states, but in doing so
it creates a fertile ground for jurisdictional litigation.").
150. See, e.g., Johnston v. Multidata Sys. Int'l Corp., 523 F.3d 602, 611 (5th Cir.
2008) ("This circuit has consistently imposed the high standard set by the Supreme Court
when ruling on general jurisdiction issues."); Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d
1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated, en banc, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (referring to
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couple of employees who reported to work there, that would most likely
not have been enough to constitute doing business for the purpose of
the U.S. jurisdictional test.1 5 '
What is important, however, is that the U.S. Supreme Court in
Daimler considered even this doing business standard-which is
stricter than the carrying on business standard-to be "unacceptably
grasping."1 52 Accordingly, it dramatically reined in the test for general
jurisdiction over corporations. Now, in order for a corporation to be
subject to general jurisdiction outside its state of incorporation or the
state of its principal place of business, the corporation has to have such
significant contacts with that state that it can be considered at home
there.1 53 The gulf between the law as it exists in Canada and as it
exists in the United States is enormous.
The rationales underpinning the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Daimler are worth examining since they also apply to the Supreme
Court of Canada's decision in Chevron. First, the U.S. Supreme Court
noted that an expansive interpretation of general jurisdiction poses
risks to international comity.1 54 The Court observed that "[o]ther
nations do not share the uninhibited approach to personal jurisdiction
advanced by the Court of Appeals in this case."' 55 For instance, the
Court pointed to the fact that, under the Brussels Regulation,15 6 which
governs jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in the European
Union, a corporation may generally be sued in the nation in which it is
"'domiciled,' a term defined to refer only to the location of the
corporation's 'statutory seat,' 'central administration,' or 'principal
place of business."" 5 7 Furthermore, the Court noted that unpredictable
assertions of general jurisdiction over U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
the "high standard the Ninth Circuit has set" and noting that "the presence of general
jurisdiction in the instant case is a close question.").
151. See, e.g., Cossaboon v. Maine Medical Ctr., 600 F.3d 25, 33-36, 39 (1st Cir.
2010) (holding that defendant hospital did not establish continuous and systematic
contacts in New Hampshire even though it registered to do business and employed one
person in the state, advertised to residents of the state, and operated a website accessible
in the state.); Riemer v. KSL Recreation Corp., 348 Ill. App. 3d 26, 40-41, 807 N.E.2d
1004, 1016-17 (2004) (explaining that the presence of an individual employee and a
website accessible in Illinois were not sufficient contacts to rise to the level of "doing
business."); Alkanani v. Aegis Def. Servs., LLC, 976 F. Supp. 2d 13, 29-30 (D.D.C. 2014)
(holding that the defendant corporation's meetings, negotiations, website, tax filings,
and even meetings between company executives and clients in the forum state were not
sufficient to constitute doing business).
152. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761.
153. In the years since Daimler was decided, courts have interpreted this "at
home" basis for general jurisdiction extremely narrowly.
154. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
155. Id.
156. Brussels I Regulation (Recast), Council Regulation (EU) No. 1215/2012, art.
4, O.J. L. 351/1 (2012).
157. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763.
62.120177
VANDERBIL TIOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW
corporations could discourage foreign investment. 158 As it stands now,
Canada appears to be an outlier when it comes to corporations and
presence-based jurisdiction. Foreign corporations may be concerned
that they will be subject to general jurisdiction in a Canadian province
even though they have very little commercial presence there. This may
lead corporations to structure their affairs differently, or to avoid
engaging in business in Canada altogether.
Second, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daimler expressed concern
that jurisdiction based on a corporation doing business in a forum
would lead to unpredictable results for defendants.1 59 A corporate
defendant would never know with certainty whether its conduct met
the threshold necessary to constitute continuous and systematic
general business contacts. 160 This is also a concern now in Canada. The
Supreme Court of Canada in Chevron held that a corporation is subject
to jurisdiction if it carries on business in the province and is served
with process there. 161 While carrying on business definitively requires
a lower quantum of connection than doing business, it is still unknown
exactly what constitutes carrying on business. Accordingly,
corporations in Canada may not know whether their minor presence in
a province would be sufficient to ground jurisdiction if they are
physically served in the province. Certainly, Chevron Canada itself did
not realize that being served with process at a remote satellite location
with a handful of workers would be enough to subject it to jurisdiction
in Ontario.
Finally, the U.S. Supreme Court in Daimler was concerned that
broad assertions of general jurisdiction would encourage forum
shopping.1 62 The Court expressed reservations about U.S. courts being
open for business to out-of-state or out-of-country plaintiffs whose
cause of action has nothing to do with the defendant's connections to
the forum.' 6 3 To allow assertions of general jurisdiction because the
158. Id. (citing Brief for the Respondents at 35; Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2).
159. Id.
160. See id. at 761-62 ("If Daimler's California activities sufficed to allow
adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global reach would
presumably be available in every other State in which MBUSA's sales are sizable. Such
exorbitant exercises of all-purpose jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state
defendants 'to structure their primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
where that conduct will and will not render them liable to suit."') (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985)).
161. Chevron, 3 S.C.R. at para. 94.
162. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757.
163. The Court referenced an example of such impermissible forum shopping. See
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 ("[I]f a Daimler-manufactured vehicle overturned in Poland,
injuring a Polish driver and passenger, the injured parties [under plaintiffs theory] could
maintain a design defect suit in California. Exercises of personal jurisdiction so
exorbitant, we hold, are barred by due process constraints on the assertion of
adjudicatory authority.") (citations omitted).
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defendant is carrying on business in the forum certainly promotes
forum shopping. If plaintiffs can find a forum where the defendant is
carrying on business, they can sue there over something that happened
elsewhere and benefit from the application of the selected forum's
procedural (and perhaps substantive) law.164 This forum shopping is
exactly what happened in Chevron itself. Chevron Canada has little to
no connection with Ontario: its head office is in Alberta and its
registered office is in British Columbia. However, in order to have the
action proceed against both Chevron and Chevron Canada in a
singular forum, and perhaps for other strategic reasons, the plaintiffs
chose to initiate the action in Ontario. The Chevron case is simply an
enforcement action; one would imagine that the potential for forum
shopping would be much more acute at first instance.
The disconnect between presence-based jurisdiction over
corporations in Canada and corporations in the United States could not
be greater. While U.S. courts are curbing broad assertions of
jurisdiction over corporations, Canadian courts are doing the opposite.
For years, commentators have lamented broad exercises of jurisdiction
by U.S. courts, noting that the United States was an outlier in its
approach to jurisdiction.1 65 If the United States was an outlier then,
what is Canada now? Canada's approach to jurisdiction over
corporations is far more radical than the U.S. approach ever was.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Chevron case was released, most looked to the precedent
it would set for the recognition and enforcement of judgments and/or
the law of corporate personality. This Article suggests, however, that
the biggest implication of the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in
Chevron might be what it said about presence-based jurisdiction over
corporations. The Court in Chevron held that tag jurisdiction for
corporations was perfectly appropriate-indeed, that it was a
longstanding and traditional basis for jurisdiction. As long as a
corporation is carrying on business and can physically be served with
process in a province, then it will be subject to jurisdiction there. The
provincial court will have general jurisdiction over the corporation,
meaning that the corporation can be held to account in the province for
any and all wrongs, wherever committed.
The Supreme Court of Canada provided rather flimsy support for
the proposition that the practice of asserting presence-based jurisdiction
was well-established. In fact, in the leading case cited for presence-based
jurisdiction, Incorporated Broadcasters, the Ontario Court of Appeal
164. See Ferens v. John Deere, 494 U.S. 516, 524 (1990).
165. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Jurisdictional Salvation and the Hague Treaty,
85 CORNELL L. REV. 89, 95-96 (1999) ("The Europeans' principal objection to U.S.
jurisdictional law is its proclivity to base general jurisdiction on rather thin contacts.").
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appeared not to understand what presence-based jurisdiction was.
Regardless of whether there is support for presence-based jurisdiction in
the case law, the more important question is whether tag jurisdiction
over corporations is a good idea. This Article has identified numerous
problems with asserting presence-based jurisdiction over corporations.
Foremost among these problems is the concern about creating universal
jurisdiction over corporations without an adequate conceptual
framework or justification. Additionally, presence-based jurisdiction
does not align well with the Van Breda framework for assumed
jurisdiction. In particular, the presumptive connecting factor of
"carrying on business" is now largely superfluous under the Van Breda
test; if a corporation is carrying on business, it should simply be served
in juris under a presence-based jurisdiction theory, rather than ex juris
under the real and substantial connection test.
As the discussion of U.S. law demonstrates, presence-based
jurisdiction over corporations is not really needed. There are plenty of
ways for a court to assume jurisdiction over a corporation (specifically,
at its place of domicile and where it carries on business under the Van
Breda framework). To open jurisdiction up more broadly will simply
invite forum shopping and result in unfair assertions of jurisdiction with
respect to corporations that have a minimal connection to the forum.
For now, the precedent in Chevron stands. Corporations in
Canada are subject to tag jurisdiction-jurisdiction based on a
corporation being served in any province where it is carrying on
business. How this development will play out over the long-term
remains to be seen. However, if the consequences are as predicted in
this Article, it may be that the Supreme Court of Canada decides to
revisit this decision sooner rather than later.
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